Category: The Firm

Our new office location

pat-flangan-attorney-twin-cities

We are happy to announce that Flanagan Law Office has opened a 2nd office near the University of Minnesota in the Twin Cities.

Flanagan’s offices are now both centrally in the corridor of University Avenue and Highway 280 on border of Minneapolis and St. Paul. The new office location is right on the Light Rail line and just two blocks from the stadium.

Contact Pat Flanagan Defense today if you are in need of any legal advice or guidance. We’re now serving you in two locations of the Twin Cities.

Flanagan Law Office

5669 147th Street N.
P.O. Box 167
Hugo, MN 55038

Telephone: 763-786-5324 or 651-200-3484
Fax: 651-200-3486

Map and Directions

University Location

2701 University Avenue South East
Suite 209
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55414-3236

Telephone: 763-786-5324 or 651-200-3484
Fax: 651-200-3486

Map and Directions

Youth Soccer Player punches Referee who later dies

Despite the many good things to be learned when playing sports, there are the occasions where things go terribly wrong. Not only do these occasions hurt the team for which the player is a member, but also may seriously effect the people involved in the altercations. The young man in the story below lost control of his temper, punched a referee and now may face murder charges. You can also read the article below and then see the Reese Witherspoon video of her asking an officer the always dumb question: “do you know who I am?”

http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/soccer/2013/05/05/police-utah-soccer-referee-punched-by-player-dies/2136379/

For the Reese Witherspoon video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9fwe_NEerE

For just $0.99, now you too can create your own independent Nation online.

The case of United States v. Reed is an interesting case. In an attempt to avoid federal laws as an independent American Indian nation, Mr. Reed became a member of an online tribal nation. Only problem is that this internet nation is not a recognized nation by the Federal Government. Mr. Reed then relied upon his believed sovereignty to threaten a federal court judge, convey the threat to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and then threaten jail members with the use of his 9 mm hand gun. Read below to find out more about this truth is stranger than fiction case, or call me at 651-200-3484

UNITED STATES v. REED
Federal District Court of North Dakota

Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a fugitive and
asserted insufficient evidence to support “constructive possession”
verdict. He also challenged the court’s instruction defining “fugitive”.

Although not a Native American, the defendant used the internet to become a
member of the unrecognized Little Shell Nation Indian Tribe and then became
the self proclaimed tribal attorney general. He challenged a federal
court’s jurisdiction over fellow non-Native American tribal members by
leaving a threat to harm a federal court judge on the judge’s voice mail.
The defendant repeated this threat in a voice mail to the FBI.

In the meantime, a Nevada state court issued a capias warrant for the defendant’s
failure to appear for a non-related state prosecution. The FBI tracked him
to North Dakota where he was arrested on the capias warrant. While incarcerated,
the defendant had a jail visit and made a phone call, both taped, repeating
the threat and mentions his 9mm hand gun. When a fellow non-Native
American tribal member was prevented from seeing the defendant at the jail,
the defendant broadened his threats and defiantly yelled that he would
use his 9mm hand gun in the safe in his house. The subsequent search
warrant discovered a 9 mm. hand gun and personal venue in the defendant’s
safe in his home.

The court found the evidence was sufficient to find that Defendant was a fugitive from justice regarding the capias warrant from Nevada and that he possessed a firearm while a fugitive.

Civil Case – Dog Bite Liability

Dog Bites are an unfortunate common occurrence.    Dogs are animals and no matter how well trained can be unpredictable.   People will often have serious injuries as a result of these bites.  life long scars can be left.    At times, people may be bitten while visiting or living in an apartment complex.  While it is clear that case law allows for the owner of the dog to be liable in certain situations, in Minnesota it is less likely that an owner of an apartment complex will be held liable.  Below is an example of how the courts analyze a landlord situation in a dog bite case in Minnesota.

 

259 N.W.2d 896 (1977)

Phyllis Marie GILBERT, as Mother and Natural Guardian of Robin Lee Kendrick, a Minor, and Phyllis Marie Gilbert, Individually, Appellants,
v.
Russell CHRISTIANSEN, Defendant,
Towns Edge Properties, Inc., Respondent.

No. 46636.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 14, 1977.

Bell, Stapleton & Nolan and Mark M. Nolan, St. Paul, for appellants.

Van Eps & Gilmore and Duane E. Arndt, and Wayne D. Tritbough, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard before SHERAN, C. J., and PETERSON and TODD, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.

KELLY, Justice.

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment for defendant entered on a directed verdict. We affirm.

This is an appeal involving construction of Minn.St. 347.22, the dog-bite statute. The facts are uncontroverted. On February 26, 1974, plaintiff Phyllis Gilbert and her 3-year-old son, Robin Kendrick, were at home in their apartment in Mounds View. A neighbor in the same apartment building, defendant Russell Christiansen, stopped in for a cup of coffee. Accompanying Christiansen was his German shorthaired dog. The dog lay under the kitchen table while coffee was served. Christiansen then left but did not take his dog with him, as Mrs. Gilbert requested. The dog some 15 minutes later bit Robin, causing severe facial lacerations.

Plaintiffs brought an action against Christiansen and Towns Edge Properties, Inc., (Towns Edge) a corporation that managed the apartment complex, alleging defendants’ liability both under the common law and Minn.St. 347.22. Christiansen defaulted and judgment was entered against him. At the close of plaintiffs’ case, Towns Edge moved for a directed verdict. The court granted the motion, holding that Towns Edge was not liable at common law and that it was not an “owner” of the dog within the meaning of the statute. On this 897*897 appeal, plaintiffs challenge the court’s ruling regarding the statutory liability of Towns Edge.

In 1951 the legislature provided an additional source of liability, apart from the common law, for dog owners. Minn.St. 347.22 provides:

“If a dog, without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may lawfully be in any urban area, the owner of the dog is liable in damages to the person so attacked or injured to the full amount of the injury sustained. The term `owner’ includes any person harboring or keeping a dog. The term `dog’ includes both male and female of the canine species.” (Italics supplied.)

In Verrett v. Silver, Minn., 244 N.W.2d 147 (1976), we considered the meaning of “owner” and approved the following jury instruction as an accurate statement of the law:

“* * * Harboring or keeping a dog means something more than a meal of mercy to a stray dog or the casual presence of a dog on someone’s premises. Harboring means to afford lodging, to shelter or to give refuge to a dog. Keeping a dog, as used in the statute before us, implies more than the mere harboring of the dog for a limited purpose or time. One becomes the keeper of a dog only when he either with or without the owner’s permission undertakes to manage, control or care for it as dog owners in general are accustomed to do.” Minn., 244 N.W.2d 149.

It is evident from application of this statement to the present case that defendant apartment managers are not harborers or keepers of tenants’ dogs, as these terms are used in Minn.St. 347.22. Plaintiffs suggest two factors, however, that purportedly militate for a finding that Towns Edge was the “owner” of the dog.

Initially, plaintiffs contend that Towns Edge had a right to exercise control over the dog and therefore should be responsible for the dog’s conduct. The control cited by plaintiffs consisted of rules and regulations promulgated by Towns Edge relating to the care of pets and its right to exclude dogs from the complex. This argument is unpersuasive because the rules and regulations, even if an adequate basis for finding control, were not applicable within a tenant’s apartment. Compare Siegel v. 1536-46 St. John’s Place Corp., 184 Misc. 1053, 57 N.Y. S.2d 473 (City Ct. 1945) (owner and operator of an apartment house, who possessed prior knowledge of the vicious tendencies of the superintendent’s dog, held responsible for the action of the dog in a common area) with Denagy v. Doscher, 40 Misc.2d 643, 243 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup.Ct.1963) (complaint insufficient because it failed to allege that the landlord controlled the property where the dog was kept).[1] Nor is the mere right to exclude dogs a sufficient ground to make Towns Edge an insurer of the conduct of dogs residing in the apartment complex. Other courts have implicitly agreed by failing to find a landlord responsible on that basis alone for a tenant’s pet. Denagy v. Doscher, 40 Misc.2d 643, 243 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup.Ct.1963); Collins v. Otto, 149 Colo. 489, 369 P.2d 564 (1962); Harris v. Turner, 1 Wash.App. 1023, 466 P.2d 202 (1970). Accord, Hagenau v. Millard, 182 Wis. 544, 195 N.W. 718 (1923) (employer who provided employee living quarters and also sublet another room of building to employee’s husband not keeper of her dog), cited approvingly in Verrett v. Silver, Minn., 244 N.W.2d 147, 149 (1976); Weiss v. Wilkins, 313 A.2d 897 (Del.Super.Ct.1973) (lessor of gas station); Laguttuta v. Chisholm, 65 A.D. 326, 72 N.Y.S. 905 (1901) (principal whose agent managed property); Restatement, Torts 2d, § 514, comment a: “[T]he possession of the land on which the animal is kept, even when coupled with permission given to a third person to keep it, is not 898*898 enough to make the possessor of the land liable as a harborer of the animal.”[2]

Plaintiffs also contend that Towns Edge gained an economic benefit from the dog’s presence in the apartment building and therefore should be denominated an “owner.” An increased rental of $10 per month was charged to tenants with pets. Uncontroverted testimony indicated, however, that the surcharge was designed to cover the increased property damage and maintenance necessitated by the presence of pets. Increased occupancy is the second supposed source of economic advantage derived by permitting tenants to have pets. Although increased occupancy is a credible source of economic benefit, it is an insufficient basis on which to deem Towns Edge an “owner.” See cases cited, supra. In the cases that recognize economic benefit as a relevant factor in determining whether a defendant was a keeper of an animal, the economic benefit derived from the animal’s presence was much more direct. Compare Stamp v. Eighty-Sixth Street Amusement Co., 95 Misc. 599, 159 N.Y.S. 683 (Sup.Ct.1916) (lions that escaped from cages and caused panic in theater were in keeping of theater owner who contracted for their appearance); Smith v. Jalbert, 351 Mass. 432, 221 N.E.2d 744 (1966) (zebra that escaped from animal display was in “keeping” of licensor of exhibit, who subjected the exhibit to rules and regulations and shared in its proceeds) with Theobald v. Grey Public Relations, Inc., 39 A.D.2d 902, 334 N.Y.S.2d 281, leave to appeal denied, 31 N.Y.2d 644, 339 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 291 N.E.2d 589 (1972) (model at auto show mauled by lion; no basis for imposing liability on lessor of the premises).

The circumstances do not indicate that Towns Edge harbored or kept the dog so as to be liable as its “owner.” Despite plaintiffs’ attempt to demonstrate that the instant facts are unique, a judgment in their favor would render it difficult, either through unavailability or prohibitive cost, for prospective tenants with dogs to find housing. Determination of policy on this matter is a question for the legislature. At present, Minn.St. 347.22 does not envision Towns Edge’s liability in these circumstances.

Affirmed.

WAHL, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[1] Verrett v. Silver, Minn., 244 N.W.2d 147 (1976), indicates that one can be an “owner” without immediate control of the dog. The defendant there was on vacation when the dog bite occurred, but he permitted the owner and her dog to stay in his house, an area over which he had the right to exercise control.

[2] Generally, cases from other jurisdictions do not involve construction of a statute, but since at common law one who harbors a dog is as responsible as its possessor for its conduct, Restatement, Torts 2d, § 514, the cases are relevant to the instant determination.

Discovery of Garbage Contents and Constructive Possession

Sometimes people assume that their garbage is still their property. Law Enforcement needs a warrant to search a person’s property unless there is a recognized exception. However, Law Enforcement will often search a person’s garbage without a warrant. So, how can this occur? The questioned is answered by the garbage’s location. If the garbage is at the roadside ready to be picked up by the garbage company, the garbage will, in most cases, be considered abandoned property. Thus, the homeowner no longer has an expectation of privacy. On other occasions law enforcement will wait until the garbage company actually picks up the garbage, meet the garbage truck at a pre-determined location and then take the specified garbage off the truck to search. In this scenario, the garbage has been clearly abandoned by the homeowner and there is no longer an expectation of privacy for the property.

Another question that is often raised is, “Nobody saw me with that item and I was not there when the cops found it. How can I be charged with possession?” This is where the Constructive Possession theory comes into play. The government will try to show that the house, room or area where the item was found was possessed and controlled by a particular person. Law Enforcement will look for letters, mail, photographs, identification or other items to establish this. This information will then be presented to the jury to show that the person had control over the room and must have therefore known about the item in question.

To read a practical example as to how search of garbage and constructive possession applies in a real life case, go to my blog at www.patflanagandefense.com

Below is a case that shows how items discovered in a person’s garbage and how constructive possession can result in a conviction.

U.S. v. Obell and Barbara Vanover, case nos. 09-3571 and 09-3599, Federal District Court of Iowa

Per Curiam opinion. Obell and Barbara Vanover, husband and wife, appealed their drug trafficking and firearm convictions. The Vanovers argued there was insufficient evidence to convict them of the crimes. The Federal Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court opinion.

Facts: In August, 2007, an anonymous caller informed Detective Weber that the
Vanovers were selling and using methamphetamine in their Des Moines, Iowa, home. Law Enforcement searched the Vanovers’ curbside garbage two months later after the call. In the garbage law enforcement found various letters, corners of baggies and a small jeweler’s baggy with methamphetamine residue. In an
unrelated investigation in December, 2007, a Confidential Informant led detectives to a person who was considered a source of methamphetamine. Law enforcement kept this source under surveillance. This source then led law enforcement to the Vanovers. With the information from the garbage and with the information gathered from keeping the source under surveillance, law enforcement applied for and obtained a search warrant for the Vanover’s home. When law enforcement arrived in order to execute the search warrant at the residence, Barbara Vanover was home, but Obell Vanover was not. Barbara Vanover waived her right to remain silent and law enforcement interviewed in her in the bathroom. During the search, Obell Vanover arrived home from work and was handcuffed. Obell Vanover then waived his right to remain silent and was interviewed for an hour in the basement. While certain law enforcement officers interviewed the Vanovers, other law enforcement officers continued searching the house and garage. During the search, law enforcement found drugs, drug paraphernalia and firearms. The Vanovers’ fingerprints were not found on any of the firearms.

A trial occurred and a jury found the Vanovers guilty. Obell Vanover was
sentenced to 420 months and Barbara Vanover was sentenced to 181 months. Both Vanovers appealed.

Issue:

The Vanover’s argued that the jury did not have sufficient evidence to convict them of Felon In Possession Of A Weapon.

The Court of Appeals ruled there was sufficient evidence to support Felon In Possession of a Weapons conviction. Even though the Vanovers’ fingerprints did not appear on any of the guns, one of the guns was underneath their bedroom mattress. The theory of constructive possession established control, ownership or dominion over the firearm.
In addition, the Vanovers lived in the same house, slept in the same bed, there was mail addressed to Barbara Vanover found near gun and she admitted she knew about the gun.

Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence that the Vanovers possessed the gun “in furtherance of drug trafficking crime.” An Expert testified that drug dealers like the Vanovers use firearms for personal protection, intimidation and to safeguard drugs and cash. The gun was found in close proximity to large amounts of cash,
drugs and drug paraphernalia.

Search based upon a minor traffic offense

Client’s often ask how an officer can search their car after being stopped for a minor traffic offense. I am usually presented with the statement, or question, “they should have just given me a ticket and let me go.” Unfortunately, my clients often find there is more to it than what might routinely happen on most occasions. One example is the search incident to arrest doctrine. The case of United States v. Joshua Randolph out of Federal District of Missouri helps to explain how this doctrine works.

United States v. Joshua Randolph
App. from the W.D. Mo.

Facts: Detectives with Kansas City Police Department were conducting surveillance on an unrelated case when the noticed Defendant Randolph. The detectives followed Randolph as they recognized the car as belonging to a known female PCP
dealer and therefore knew Randolph was not the owner of the car. The officers followed Defendant Randolph to a residence. Officers had previously received information from a confidential informant that drugs were sold at
that residence. However, several attempts to purchase drugs from this
residence with a confidential informant and an undercover officer were unsuccessful. Defendant Randolph left that residence and went to a
different residence. The Detectives had uniformed officers standing by to stop
Randolph. The uniformed officers knew they were going to stop Randolph
before they ever saw him. Randolph parked in the driveway and went inside
the house, his family’s house. Defendant Randolph drank a beer on the sidewalk of his family’s home. After 30 minutes Randolph left. As Randolph was driving he pulled over to park on the side of a city street. Officers claimed Randolph failed to use his turn signal when he pulled over to park. Failing to signal when parking
is a traffic violation that is rarely enforced, but if it is enforced, it is usually done by giving the driver a citation. By the time uniformed officers approached, Defendant Randolph he had already parked his car, locked it and was walking away. When asked by Officers, Defendant Randolph stated it was not his car. Officers ordered Randolph back to the car, frisked and handcuffed him immediately. While the officer’s were running Randolph for warrants another officer came and looked into the car and said he saw a gun on the driver’s floorboard. The officer reached
through the window, opened the locked door and examined the gun. Randolph
was arrested for Felon In Possession of a Weapon, turning without a signal and public consumption of alcohol. The car was then searched after the officer’s observation. The searched and revealed a .380 handgun, crack, powder cocaine, PCP, marijuana and documents in Randolph’s name.

The Defendant brought a motion to suppress the stop of the vehicle and the search of the vehicle pursuant to the 4th Amendment of the Constitution

Issues:
(1) Traffic Stop

a. The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Ruled that:

1. An officer may initiate a traffic stop after the driver has
stopped the car and exited the vehicle.

2. The Officer’s decision to stop the driver is reasonable if the officer
has probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred.

3. Any traffic violation, however minor, provides probable
cause for a traffic stop.

a. Failing to signal is sufficient probable cause
even if the officer is suspicious of other crimes.

(2) Search Incident to Arrest

a. Defendant Randolph argued that at the time the officers searched the car Randolph was under arrest for failing to signal and there was no reason to believe there was evidence in the car of a crime being committed. Officers are not allowed to search a car unless there is evidence of a crime in the car, or that they have probable cause to believe such. This analysis takes place at the time Officers searched the vehicle, not after searching the vehicle and analyzing backwards. Furthermore, under Arizona v. Gant – officers are not allowed to search outside the arms length of a suspect without a warrant because there is no officer safety exception outside that arms length. In this case, Officers didn’t know Randolph was a felon until after the car was searched. Therefore, at the time of the search, officers did not have information that vehicle held evidence of a crime (felon in possession of a weapon).

b. The Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit Ruled:

1. Under Arizona v. Gant police may search a car incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest (remember, in this case, the offense was failing to signal before parking).

2. On the stand, the officers claim they knew Randolph was a felon
at the time they searched the car.

(3) Standing – this is where the decision turned against the defendant

a. The 8th Circuit noted:
1. An individual’s 4th Amendment Rights under the Constitution are personal and may not be vicariously asserted.

2. Since Randolph had disavowed ownership, he is precluded
from claiming the search was unconstitutional because he did not have standing to challenge the search of another’s property.

What this means is that even if the true owner would challenge the search, that challenge would only apply to the true owner, not to Defendant Randolph. As the true owner was never charged with an offense, or indicted with an offense, there is no challenge here.

The Independent Source Doctrine

Yesterday I discussed the Miranda and how the Courts apply Miranda to statements made to the government. Within that discussion, I mentioned the independent source doctrine. Also known as the independent source exception or the independent source rule this doctrine refers to Evidence initially discovered during an unlawful search, but later obtained independently through activities untainted by the illegality, may be admitted into evidence at trial.
Justice James Browning of the United States District Court of New Mexico described the doctrine as follows: “The exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction of evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is seized or acquired during an unlawful search. Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the exclusionary rule bars the admission of physical evidence and live testimony obtained directly or indirectly through the exploitation of unconstitutional police conduct. If police conduct includes unconstitutional searches that acquire information used to obtain a search warrant, then evidence seized during the later search conducted pursuant to warrant would be inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. When determining whether evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree, a court is to consider whether the evidence was come at by exploitation of the initial illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Under the independent-source doctrine, evidence that is obtained based upon information unrelated to an unlawful search is not fruit of the poisonous tree. Evidence therefore need not be excluded under the fruits-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine if there is an independent source for discovery of the challenged evidence.”
In US v Khabeer, The Court of Appeals outlined their analysis of the doctrine as follows: “The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits police from entering a home without a warrant unless the circumstances fit an established exception to the warrant requirement. The government does not defend the constitutionality of (the officer’s) entry and his observations in the home. The government claims, however, that because Miller’s information was not used in the application for a search warrant, the independent source doctrine permits the admission of evidence later seized from the home, despite an earlier unlawful search by (the officer).
“This rule is rooted in the view that the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. To establish that the independent source doctrine applies to evidence seized pursuant to a warrant obtained after an unlawful entry to a home, the government must show both (1) that the decision to seek the warrant was independent of the unlawful entry—i.e., that police would have sought the warrant even if the initial entry had not occurred—and (2) that the information obtained through the unlawful entry did not affect the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant.”
The following is a practical example:
United States v. Kevin Craig, App. from N.D. of Iowa

Facts: Police received call from motorist who reported seeing a young
woman walking down the road carrying a baby. While the officers were
looking for the lady and her baby, they received another call that young
woman and baby were seeking shelter at a house in the area. Officers came
and spoke to the woman. The woman said Craig, her stepfather, had been
drinking heavily with friends when he got a gun from a bedroom and shot a
hole through the front door. The woman took her baby to a bedroom until Craig came in, screamed at her and pulled her hair.

The woman told police that Craig was a felon and had sexually assaulted her in
the past. Officers spoke and decided to go to Craig’s residence to see if he was home. If. If he wasn’t home they would then get a warrant.

Officers arrived after midnight. When the officers knocked a man named Sawvel answered and was immediately handcuffed. Officers asked Sawvel where Craig was. Swavel told officers that Craig left earlier in the night. Officers asked Sawvel for permission to search the home. Sawvel said “dowhat you got to do…..its not my house.” Officers entered the house and announced themselves as “Sheriff’s Office.”
Craig then yelled out from the bedroom wanting to know “Who the fuck is in
my house and what the fuck is going on?”. Officers ordered Craig out of the
room. In response to officer’s questioning, Craig responded creatively. During questioning by the officers, Craig admitted to being a felon and firing a gun earlier in the evening. Craig was arrested. While inside the residence Officers observed marijuana and several firearms.

After all of this, Officers then decided to prepare a search warrant
application for the Court to review. The officers obtained a warrant and seized the firearms, ammo and other items. Craig was arrested on state charges.

After posting bond, Craig decided to go to the sheriff’s office to explain his position. While at the Sheriff’s office Craig requested a urine test and asked to speak to the Sheriff. The urine test was given. Craig was finally Mirandized and made a recorded statement. During the statement Craig did his best effort to make things worse. Craig admitted to using a “shotgun” as a club, shooting a “snub nose” and going into his daughter’s room and wrestling with her. Craig was indicted with Felon In Possession of A Weapon.

Craig filed motion to suppress evidence and statements to Officers at the scene and also to the Sheriff. The Federal District Court denied the motion to suppress because, first, physical evidence was admissible pursuant to independent source doctrine and two, the statements to the Sheriff were sufficiently separated from the warrantless entry into the residence that the new evidence was not fruit of poisonous tree.
The District Court did suppress the statements at residence.

Issues:

(1) Denial of Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence

a. Craig claimed the officers illegally entered his residence.
b. The Government agreed that the roommate did not have permission to grant officers permission to search the residence and therefore did not argue the entry was a valid warrantless entry. Instead, the government argued that the evidence discovered during the illegal entry is admissible under independent source doctrine

1. Obtaining the search warrant based upon the statements made to the Sheriff was the independent source.

c. The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the situation in the following manner:

1. The search of the residence was illegal. The visitor did not have the authority to grant a search of the residence and there were no exigent (immediate) circumstances to warrant an entry without a warrant. The warrant obtained after the illegal search of the residence, is not an
independent source if either of the following are true:

a. if the agents’ decision to seek the warrant was
prompted by what they had seen during the initial entry.

2. The 8th Circuit said the officers would have gotten the search warrant had Craig not been home, so the entry without the warrant was not a problem.

a. However, if the information obtained during the entry was
presented to the Magistrate and affect his decision to issue the warrant, then the 8th Circuit’s test is whether the redacted application (taking out the information from the illegal search) supports probable cause.

3. Craig conceded that absent the tainted information, there was still probable cause for a search warrant to be issued. Craig then argued that the statements used to the Sheriff should be excluded because those were only given as a result of the information obtained by police as a result of the illegal search.

a. The Court rejected this argument. Stating that, while verbal statements obtained as a result of the 4th Amendment violation are as much subject to exclusionary rule as are items of physical
evidence, the exclusionary rule is not intended for
statements made outside of the home, where police have probable cause to arrest.

b. As such, the statements to Sheriff were not subject to exclusionary
rule because there was probable cause to arrest Craig.

Blood Draw Requires a warrant in DWI

Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor delivered the United States Supreme Court Decision today concluding that in drunk driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.

Call Flanagan Law Office at 651-200-3484, or visit www.patflanagandefense.com if you wish a free consultation to see how this decision might effect your case

To read the entire decision, click on this link: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-1425_cb8e.pdf

Pat Flanagan Defense: New Office, Expanded Service!

Lawyer Patrick Flanagan recently moved his office to Hugo, Minnesota.  This move will allow Mr. Flanagan to meet the demand and better serve his clients throughout the State of Minnesota.  Hugo is conveniently located just North of White Bear Lake and South of Forest Lake.  Only two miles away from Interstate 35E and located on directly on Highway 61, Flanagan Law Office is only minutes away from Downtown Saint Paul, Minneapolis, Anoka, Stillwater and Pine City.  The new location, only a few miles from the 35E and 35W split and Running Aces Casino, also allows for easy and quick access to such communities as Duluth, Rochester and Hastings.

Attorney Flanagan will continue to serve his clients in these communities, as well as Dakota County, Anoka County, Washington County, Olmsted County, Ramsey County, Hennepin County, The entire State of Minnesota and Federal Court.

With his new location in Hugo, Minnesota, Mr. Flanagan will not only continue his trial work on Felonies, Misdemeanors and other criminal matters, but will also expand into areas such as: personal injury, divorce/family law, wills, estates and trusts, as well as land issues.

Attorney Flanagan moves his office to Hugo, Minnesota to make his skills and abilities available to more people who need his services.  The new office is not only conveniently located near highways and interstates, but also offers free parking.

Please give Mr. Flanagan a call regarding any of your legal issues.  Here is his updated contact information:

Patrick W. FlanaganLawyer
Office: (651) 200-3484
Cell: (651) 214-7209
Fax: (651) 200-3486

http://www.patflanagandefense.com
PatrickFlanagan@Flanaganlawsite.com

5699 147th Street N.
P.O. Box 167
Hugo, MN 55038